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NATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CORRUPTION PREVENTION 
INTRODUCTION 
A curious little girl in a school once asked: "Teacher, in a circle, where does the line 
begin?" The teacher then asked the class for their answers. There was silence. Then 
another little girl said: "At the top." 
This, in essence, is where the fight against corruption starts. This is also where the buck 
ultimately stops. 
I will share with you some thoughts on dealing with corruption from a national 
perspective with focus on the contributory role of national audit institutions. 
That we are here today in deep discussion on this subject shows that corruption continues 
to be a serious challenge in most, if not all, countries. Corruption, a fact of life, has no 
respect for borders. It lurks even in countries considered corruption free. It causes the 
diversion of public funds away from the social and economic objectives intended by 
parliament when it approves the funds. It erodes public and investor trust in government 
institutions. Ultimately, the citizens suffer. 
NATIONAL FRAMEWORK 
Corruption exists regardless of the state of an economy. When an economy is booming 
and public services are unable to cope with demand, or when public officers are given 
greater discretionary authority in the name of better service, there is an increase risk of 
corruption. So too when bigger public sector projects are being contracted out, and 
procurement transactions become more complicated. 
Many countries are successful to varying degrees in keeping corruption in check as they 
achieve higher levels of socio-economic developn~ent. This, I believe, is due to a strong 
national governance structure based on acco~lntability and transparency, a framework 
which has the effect of minimizing motivation and opportunity for corruption, and 
facilitating its detection. Such framework is founded on a number of key pillars. 
TONE AT THE TOP 
The first and most important pillar is "Tone at the Top", where the circle begins. This 
refers to political will and a strong commitment to fight corruption. It is manifested by 
the top leadership driving the translation of policy into action, walking the talk and 
pushing for results. Equally important is the role of the parliament (the legislature), 
serving with the mandate of the people, having an oversight on the programs and action 
of the government, and calling on it to account for its performance. 
Down the line, public institutions need to be headed by people who are not only 
competent in their roles, but also epitomize the desired values of an effective public 
service. (In Singapore, key appointments such as Commissioner of Police, Director CPIB 
by the Government require the endorsement of the President.) 





The risk of corruption is smaller when the government body exercising authority is well 
managed such that motivation and opportunity for corruption is minimised. This requires 
transparency and accountability in the handling of financial transactions at all levels, 
augmented by a system of checks and balance. The administrative measures include 
separation of duties, staff rotation, and internal and external audits. 
There should also be structured procedures for project management which emphasizes 
value-for-money, proper risk management and post-implementation review. 
To reduce motivation for corruption, it is desirable that public officers are paid 
competitive salaries pegged to performance. This also has the effect of encouraging the 
best officers to remain in service. 
It is also helpful to have a code of conduct for public officer based on values such as 
integrity, honesty, impartiality and quality service. It is not unusual for some countries to 
require civil servants to regularly declare their financial interests such as ownership of 
property. 
Also desirable is a culture of open communication in the public service. This encourages 
officers to give feedback should they observe areas of weaknesses or abnormalities in 
work processes and operations. 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECTOR INTERFACE 
The risk of corruption exists at the interface between public and private sector. 
Traditionally, interactions between public officers and private sector parties tended to be 
limited to contractual dealings. In today's context, there is private sector involvement in 
many areas of government functions. For example, private sector people are consulted for 
feedback on policies, or appointed to the boards of government bodies to tap their 
expertise and management perspectives. They are also appointed to advisory panels and 
even regulatory bodies (where there are no conflicts of interests). All this creates an 
environment which keeps government f~~nctions efficient and sensitive to private sector 
needs. Indirectly it contributes to reducing motivation for corruption. 
WATCHDOG AGENCIES 
The role of watchdog agencies cannot be over-emphasized. These include the auditor- 
general's office and the anti-corruption agency. They respectively provide the bark in the 
system of accountability, and the bite by way of anti-corruption enforcement. 
In this regard, I have observed that in a number of countries, the anti-corruption 
enforcement and national audit function come under one agency. Although this occurs 
mostly in small countries, it shows the close link between auditing and corruption 
prevention and investigation. 
NATIONAL AUDIT INSTITUTIONS 
It is easier to prevent corruption than to detect it. National audit institutions contribute by 
fostering a preventive environment. Firstly, by evaluating the adequacy of internal 
controls and identifying weaknesses, audits help to strengthen financial management 
systems. Secondly, in financial statements audits, if the auditor comes across any sign of 
possible fraud or corruption while examining financial records, he is duty bound to bring 
this to the attention of the management. 
The International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI), the world 
federation of national audit institutions recognizes the important contributory role of 
national audit institutions in the fight against corruption. It devoted its 1 6 ~ ~  International 
Congress (INCOSAI) held in Montevideo in 1998 to preventing and detecting corruption 
as well as fraud. 
NATIONAL AUDITS 
The aim of national audits has evolved beyond ensuring compliance with financial and 
administrative laws and regulations. The responsibilities of national audit institutions 
now typically include "performance auditing". A performance audit seeks to evaluate the 
quality of the use and management of public resources with regard to economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness. The evaluation is based on comparison of an organization's 
performance against norms and predetermined criteria. 
The areas covered in such audits typically include administration of procurement 
contracts, use and management of resources, and performailce management. 
Performance auditing thus requires more than accounting knowledge; it requires 
familiarity with management and administrative processes, procurement and contracts, 
privatization and project management. Familiarity with specific industry sectors is also 
beneficial. 
For these reasons, performance audits often take a multi-disciplinary approach. The audit 
team would comprise auditors with diverse academic qualifications and work experience, 
e.g. quantity surveying, engineering, project management and management consultancy. 
Where necessary, industry experts are appointed as technical advisors. 
Because the areas subject to performance audits are also risk areas for corruption, 
forensic instinct is also a desired skill set for the auditors as corruption involves collusion 
and the trailsaction occurs "outside the books". 
IMPROVING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Performance audits also involve checks on the state of corporate governance in an 
organization. These are carried out against an accepted code of corporate governance. 
They evaluate the adequacy of processes and procedures in such areas as internal control, 
risk management and conflict of interests. 
A well performed audit therefore serves as an essential instrument for the development, 
and promotion of good governance by improving public sector management. They assist 
parliament in holding the government accountable for its stewardship of public funds and 
other resources. Progressively, national audit institutions have been moving from a 
passive reporting role towards more involvement in enhancing accountability and 
improving operatioils of government. Some examples are making recomn~endations for 
improvements, encouraging the setting up of internal auditing functions and raising 
awareness amongst public officers on corporate governance and accountability issues. 
EFFECTIVENESS OF A NATIONAL AUDIT INSTITUTION 
For a national audit institution to be effective, it needs not only competent staff, but three 
requirements are absolutely f~mdamental, viz. 
(i) legal mandate from parliament, 
(ii) independence, and 
(iii) unrestricted access to information. 
Independence is a basic feature of national audit institutions. They are empowered by law 
to choose what to audit, and to report directly to parliament without interference from any 
Party 
However, independence is meaningless without unrestricted access to information and 
records. Unrestricted access ensures enough information for auditors to establish 
evidence of the proper use and management of public funds and other resources, and to 
identify inefficiencies, wastages and losses whether due to bad administration or 
suspected corruption or fraud. 
MEXICO DECLARATION ON INDEPENDENCE OF SUPREME AUDIT 
INSTITUTIONS 
The Mexico declaration of INTOSAI (International Organisation of Supreme Audit 
Institutions) establishes guidelines on the independence of national audit institutions. 
These include such requirements as an effective legal framework, security of tenure and 
legal immunity, sufficiently broad mandate and full discretion in the discharge of duties, 
unrestricted access to information, right to report on findings, and financial and 
administrative autonomy. 
INTER-AGENCY CO-OPERATION 
Corruption involves collusion. Fighting it must involve collaboration. 
There is a strong case for national audit institutions and anti-corruption agencies to work 
collaboratively, for example in information sharing and cross referral of cases. If 
necessary, laws can be enacted to facilitate the use of shared inforn~ation. Another area of 
cooperation is the sharing of training, e.g. interpretation of financial statements. 
MEDIA 
The media also has a contributory role in creating a preventive environment. Parliament 
is expected to follow up on the auditor-general's report and raise questions in parliament 
sessions. In this regard, parliamentarians are likely to pay more attention if an audit 
finding is highlighted in a media report. 
But beyond simply reporting on audit findings, the media can also provide commentaries, 
for example, on their broader, and what they might say of the management of the 
responsible public sector agencies. This is an area that is generally lacking in media 
reporting. 
Also important is the role of the media in educating the public on corruption so as to raise 
awareness of its effects on society. This would encourage the public to play its part in 
reporting on suspected corruption. 
CONCLUSION 
Controlling corruption is an on-going effort. It requires a national approach involving the 
government, parliament, administrative policies, watch-dog agencies, the judiciary and 
media. Effective administrative policies based on accountability transparency and 
performance will help enhance the integrity and quality of public service, thereby 
minimizing the motivation and opportunity for corruption. Watch-dog agencies need to 
work collaboratively to produce maximum effect from their work. 
Most important of all, however, is "Tone at the Top". I cannot over-emphasize this. Some 
of my colleagues overseas have thrown up their hands in despair, saying: "We have a 
parliamentary system, we have an anti-corruption agency, we have an auditor-general 
who reports his findings, we have systems and procedures. Yet corruption is 
everywhere." It is f~~ndamentally in~portant hat the top leadership in government steers 
and drives the efforts to curb corruption, and that they do so in a purposeful and public 
manner. 
The journey is unending. But is there a point when one can say that corruption is in check? 
The answer, thankfully, is yes. This is when the community as a whole no longer 
tolerates corruption. It is when a person convicted of corruption not only suffers the 
penalty under the law, but also pays the price of a social stigma. 
For our own sake, and for the sake of our children, we must all do our best to reach that 
tipping point. 
